The changing labor force: some provocative findings by William E. Cullison
THECHANGINGLABORFORCE: 
SOME PROVOCATIVE  FINDINGS 
WilcMm  E.  CuLGorl 
A labor  force  participation  rate  is defined  as the 
percentage  of the  population  in the  labor  force.  The 
labor  force,  in  turn,  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  the 
numbers  of employed  and unemployed  persons.  The 
total  labor  force  includes  armed  forces  personnel, 
while  the  civilian  labor  force  does  not.  The  Bureau 
of Labor  Statistics  (BLS)  publishes  labor  force  par- 
ticipation  rates  for  various  age,  sex,  and  racial 
groupings. 
This  article  examines  changes  in  the  labor  force 
participation  rates  in various  sex and age groups  since 
1950,  with  particular  emphasis  on  developments 
since  1976.  It also  studies  long-term  trends  in labor 
force  participation  by  major  age/sex  group  after 
mid-198  1 and  tests  labor  force  participation  rates  to 
see  whether  they  have  varied  with  real  GNP,  infla- 
tion,  and/or  unemployment  since  1976. 
The  data  show that  while female  participation  rates 
have  been  rising  rapidly  since  1950,  male  participa- 
tion  rates  have  been  falling,  and  falling  especially 
rapidly  for males  5.5 years  and older  since  1970.  The 
popular  press  has  widely  reported  the  increase  in 
female  labor  force  participation,  attributing  it to  the 
“feminist  revolution,”  among  other  things.  But  the 
press  has  largely  ignored  the  decline  in  male  labor 
force  participation.  r 
The  results  of  a regression  analysis  of the  trends 
in the  data  provide  evidence  on  several  key  issues. 
These  are:  (1) the  effects  of the  Reagan  administra- 
tion’s  tax  policies  on  worker  behavior  in the  198Os, 
(2) whether  any  significant  part  of the  labor  force  is 
composed  of secondary  workers  who  participate  only 
when  times  get  hard  such  that  extra  earnings  are 
needed  to maintain  the  family’s income  (the  so-called 
“additional  worker”  effect),  and  (3)  whether  any 
significant  portion  of  workers  become  discouraged 
and  drop  out  of the  labor  force  in hard  times  when 
jobs  are  difficult  to  find. 
1 The  economics  literature,  on  the  other  hand,  is replete  with 
studies  that  recognize  and  attempt  to explain  the  declining  labor 
force  participation  of older  males.  See,  for  example,  the  survey 
articles  by  Killingsworth  and  Heckman  [I],  Lazear  121, and 
Pencavel  131, in  the  Handbook  of L.abor  Economics. 
The  analysis  concludes  that  the  Reagan  admini- 
stration’s reductions  of marginal  income  tax rates  after 
mid-1981  had  no  apparent  influence  on  labor  force 
participation.  Other  findings  cast  doubt  on  the 
extent  of a discouraged  worker  effect  on  labor  force 
participation  but  provide  evidence  consistent  with 
an additional  worker  effect.  The  results  of the  analysis 
also  suggest  some  surprising  possible  effects  of the 
female  work  revolution  on  female  and  male  labor 
force  participation.  Before  these  issues  can  be  d:is- 
cussed,  however,  it is necessary  to  present  the  data 
and  the  regression  analysis. 
1. 
TRENDS  IN  LABOR  FORCE  PARTICIPATION 
SINCE  1950 
Chart  1 depicts  civilian participation  rates  for males 
and  females  16 and  over  for  the  1950  to  1988  time 
period.  Almost  34 percent  of the  16 and over  female 
population  was  in  the  labor  force  in  1950,  but  Iby 
1988  the  percentage  had  increased  to  56.6.  In con- 
trast,  86.2  percent  of  the  16  and  over  male  popu- 
lation  was  in  the  labor  force  in  19.50,  but  that 
percentage  had  declined  to  76.2  by  1988. 
The  chart  thus  summarizes  the  striking  changes 
in the  composition  of the  labor  force  in the  past  .38 
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30  ECONOMIC REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1989 years,  which  in  numbers  of  persons  affected  might 
best  be  characterized  as follows.  If the  population 
in 1988  had the  same  labor force  participation  by sex 
that  it  had  in  1950,  the  labor  force  would  include 
8.9  million  more  males  and  22 million  fewer  females. 
Charts  2 and  3 illustrate  the  changes  in labor  force 
participation  for  females  and  males  in  the  20-24, 
25-54,  55-64,  and  65  and  over  age  groups.  Chart  2 
shows  that  females  in the  prime  20-24  and 25-54  age 
groups  have  been  the  major  source  of female  labor 
force  growth,  with  the  overall  participation  rate  of 
20-54  females  rising from  approximately  40 percent 
in 1950  to almost  73 percent  in 1988.  The  participa- 
tion  rate  of females  in  the  55-64  age  category  also 
rose  over  1.5 percentage  points  from  1950  to  1970, 
but  since  1970  participation  rates  in that  age  group 
have  seemed  to  stabilize.  Female  labor  force  par- 
ticipation  in the  6.5 and  over  category,  on  the  other 
hand,  remained  stable  from  1950  to  1970,  but  it 
began  to  decline  very  slightly  after  1970. 
Chart  3 illustrates  the  changes  in male  labor  force 
participation  by age group.  In contrast  to female  labor 
force  participation,  where  most  of the  change  in par- 
ticipation  is in the  prime  20-54  age group,  the  change 
in the  male  labor  force  participation  is mostly  in the 
55 and over  age group.  In  1950,  for example,  almost 
87 percent  of the  males  in the  55-64  age group  were 
in the  labor  force,  but  by  1988  the  participation  rate 
had  dropped  to 67 percent.  Also,  almost  46 percent 
of  males  over  65  were  in  the  labor  force  in  1950, 
but  only  16.5  percent  in  1988. 
The  decline  in  labor  force  participation  of  older 
males  illustrated  by  Chart  3 has  spawned  a number 
of studies  in the  professional  economics  literature  that 
attempt  to explain  the  changes  in male  retirements. 
Some  of the  studies  are concerned  about  the  general 
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effects  of  earnings  on  the  retirement  decision,  but 
most  examine  the  changes  over  time  in  govern- 
mental  social  security  and private  pension  programs. 
The  results  of the  studies  are somewhat  inconclusive, 
however,  for different  economists  have  focused  upon 
different  causal  factors.  These  factors  include  cur- 
rent  earnings,  lifetime  earnings  profiles,  education 
levels,  wealth,  wages  in  alternative  jobs,  social 
security  benefits,  earnings  tests,  pension  levels, 
pension  payment  schedules,  and  individual  savings. 
A good  survey  of the  retirement  studies  is provided 
by  Edward  Lazear  121. 
Differences in Trends  of Labor  Force 
Participation Rates After  19812. 
To  examine  changes  in  labor  force  participation 
before  and  after  the  enactment  of  the  Economic 
Recovery  Tax  Act  (ERTA)  of  1981,  the  partici- 
pation  rates  for  the  various  age/sex  groupings  were 
examined  using  quarterly  data  over  1976-88.  In par- 
ticular,  the  participation  rates  of  the  ten  age/sex 
groups  were  regressed  on  two  variables-a  simple 
time  trend,  and  a  time  trend  multiplied  by  a 
dummy  variable  that  took  a zero  value  until  198 1: 1 
and  a  value  of  one  after  198 1: 1. 
The  results  of these  regressions  are  shown  in the 
accompanying  table.  Significant  serial  correlation  of 
the  data  was  found,  so the  regressions  are  reported 
with  the  Cochrane-Orcutt  correction.  The  coeffi- 
cients  and  t  statistics  listed  in  the  column  labeled 
“Trend  2” indicate  the  extent  of the  change  in trend 
after  1981:l.z 
2 Trend  2 is  the  straight  time  trend  multiplied  by  the  dummy 
variable  that  takes  a zero  value  before  19812  and  a value  of 
one  after  1981:l. 
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45.64  0.0597  -0.0121  0.6845 
(10.67)  (1.71)  (1.96)  (7.09) 
52.37  0.1369  -  0.0040  0.7514 
(17.93)  (5.87)  (1.08)  (9.27) 
28.36  0.2922  -0.0033  0.8984 
(8.69)  (12.33)  (1.66)  (28.75) 
21.36  0.3310  -  0.0027  0.7947 
(10.08)  (22.87)  (1.41)  (13.46) 
33.52  0.0660  -  0.0045  0.5433 
(20.96)  (4.90)  (1.73)  (4.08) 
8.95  -  0.0073  -0.00161  0.5910 
(9.46)  (0.92)  (1.07)  (4.55) 
68.07  -  0.0636  -0.0142  0.7617 
(14.32)  (1.68)  (2.41)  (8.50) 
84.15  0.0146  -  0.0076  0.3717 
(53.94)  (1.10)  (2.75)  (2.79) 
95.25  -0.0086  -0.0013  0.2501 
(193.40)  (2.04)  (1.48)  (1.91) 
95.16  -  0.0075  -0.0015  0.1821 
(215.20)  (1.96)  (1.92)  (1.35) 
88.65  -0.1348  -  0.0081  0.4717 
(61.90)  (11.10)  (3.31)  (3.69) 
27.45  -  0.0704  -0.0031  0.8943 
(6.70)  (2.36)  (1.20)  (13.49) 
(1950=  1)  (1981:2  BREAK) 
’  A  measure  of  the  so-called  “misery  index”  (the  percentage  change  in  the  CPI  from  eight  quarters  before  plus  the  unemployment  rate)  is  included  in  this 
equation.  The  coefficient  on  the  “misery”  rate  equals  0.1074;  the  t  value  is  2.98. 
‘The  percentage  change  in  real  GNP  lagged  one  quarter  is  included  in  this  equation.  The  coefficient  on  the  change  in  GNP  is  -0.0129;  the  t value  is  -2.31. 
The  table  shows  that  the  coefficients  for the  Trend 
2 variable  are negative  for &ten  age/sex  groups.  One 
can  therefore  conclude  that  there  was  no  significant 
upward  surge  of the  trend  rate of labor force  participa- 
tion  after  1981  in  any  age/sex  group  studied. 
The  coefficient  on  Trend  2  was  signzjicant/y 
negative  (at  the  95  percent  confidence  level), 
however,  only  for  three  male  age  groups-16-19, 
20-24,  and  55-64.  This  finding  indicates  that  after 
1981  relatively  more  16-24  year-old  and  55-64  year- 
old men  began  either  (1) to quit  their  jobs  (or discon- 
tinue  their  job  searches)  and  drop  out  of  the  labor 
force  or  (2)  to  refrain  from  entering  the  labor  force 
at all. In the  case  of  16-19  and  55-64  year  olds,  the 
post-1981  change  merely  accentuated  an  existing 
trend  toward  lessened  labor  force  participation. 
The  male  20-24  age group,  however,  had exhibited 
a trend  of increasing  labor  force  participation  before 
198 1,  being  the  on4  male  labor  force  group  that 
tended  to  increase  its  participation  rate  over  the 
1950-81  period.  After  the  post-1981  trend  correc- 
tion  is made,  the  net  trend  coefficient  for the  20-24 
year  group  remains  positive,  but  its value  is halved. 
How  Differences in Economic  Conditions 
Affect  Participation Rates 
A regression  equation  containing  the  two  trends 
and  the  percentage  change  in  real  GNP  as  inde- 
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ten  age/sex  groups.  The  objective  was  to  determine  nificantly  different  from  zero  in one  regression,  that 
whether  the  participation  rates  were  sensitive  to  of females  aged  25-54.  Since  the  t value  for the  CPI 
overall  economic  conditions.  One  frequently  hears  change  was lower  than  the  t statistic  on the  “misery” 
that  the  labor  force  tends  to  decline  in  times  of  coefficient,  the  table  reports  only  the  result  of  the 
econoniic  contraction  and  to  rise  in times  of expan-  regression  using  the  misery  index  as  an  argument. 
sion.  For  this  claim  to  be  consistent  with  the  data,  It  is  again  worth  mentioning  that  the  regression 
participation  rates  must  vary  directGy  with  the  rate  of  estimates  of the  coefficients  on the  Trend  2 variable 
change  in  real  GNP.  As  it  turns  out,  they  do  not.  remained  negative  in  all cases. 
The  coefficient  on  the  change  in  GNP  was 
significantly  different  from  zero  only  for  the  regres- 
sion with  male  25-54  participation  rates  as  the  depen- 
dent  variable.  The  results  of  that  regression3  are 
reported  in the  table  as the  second  equation  for that 
age/sex  group.  As the  table  shows,  however,  male 
25-54  labor  force  participation  varied  inwe&~~ with 
the  change  in real  GNP,  The  implications,  thus,  are 
that  25-54  males  participate  relatively  more  in  the 
labor  force  in  times  of  economic  contraction  and 
relatively  less  in times  of economic  expansion,  and 
that  the  state  of  the  economy  has  little  effect  on  the 
labor market  participation  of any other  age/sex  group. 
It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  coefficient  on  the 
Trend  2 remained  negative  in the  equations  that  in- 
cluded  the  change  in  real  GNP. 
II. 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  SUPPLY-SIDE  TAX POLICIES 
The  early  rhetoric  accompanying  the  supply-side 
tax policies  of the  Reagan  administration  stated  that, 
among  other  things,  lower  marginal  tax  rates  would 
provide  incentives  for  persons  to  work  harder.  As 
President  Reagan  put  it  in his  first  Ecot~o~~c  Report 
(1982), 
. . . the  first  part  of  the  year  we  work  for  ourselves.  We 
begin  working  for  the  government  only  when  our  income 
reaches  taxable  levels.  After  that,  the  more  we  earn,  the 
more  we  work  for the  government,  until  rising  tax rates  on 
each  dollar  of extra  income  discourage  many  people  from 
further  work  effort  or from  further  saving  and  investment. 
Finally,  to  examine  the  notion  that  increases  in 
inflation  and unemployment  might  induce  secondary 
workers  to join  the  labor  force  in order  to  maintain 
the  family’s existing  standard  of living, a set of regres- 
sions  was  run  with  the  two  trends  and  a measure  of 
the  so-called  “misery  index.“4  The  coefficient  on 
the  misery  index  variable  was  significantly  different 
from  zero  (at the  95  percent  level)  only  for  partici- 
pation  rates  of females  in the  25-54  age group.  That 
equation  is reported  in the  table  as the  second  equa- 
tion  for  females  25-54. 
.  .  .  We  have  set  in  place  a  fundamental  reorientation  of 
our  tax  laws.  .  .  .  The  reduction  in  marginal  rates  for  all 
taxpayers,  making  Individual  Retirement  Accounts  available 
to  all workers,  cutting  the  top  tax  bracket  from  70 percent 
to  50 percent,  and  reduction  of the  “marriage  penalty”  will 
have  a powerful  impact  on  the  incentives  for  all Americans 
to  work,  save,  and  invest  14, pp.  6-7). 
In his last Econo9nic&~~~  (1989),  President  Reagan 
summarized  his administration’s  accomplishments  as 
follows: 
Two  additional  sets  of regressions  were  also  run: 
one  using  the  unemployment  rate  as the  third  inde- 
pendent  variable,  and  the  other  using  the  percent 
change  in  the  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI).  The 
coefficient  on  the  unemployment  rate  was  not  sig- 
nificantly  different  from  zero  in any  regression,  but 
And  by reducing  taxes  and  regulatory  bureaucracy,  we  have 
unleashed  the  creative  genius  of  ordinary  Americans  and 
ushered  in an unparalleled  period  of peacetime  prosperity. 
.  .  . Our  New  Beginning  has  restored  personal  incentives 
through  a series  of tax reforms  and  tax  cuts.  These  reforms 
have  reduced  the  top  Federal  marginal  income  tax  rate  to 
less  than  one-half  the  level  that  prevailed  when  we  took 
office  and  decreased  tax  liabilities  at  all income  levels  15, 
PP.  3,  71. 
3 Three  sets  of regressions  were  calculated-one  with  the  cur- 
rent  change  in real GNP,  one  with  the  change  in real GNP  lagged 
one  quarter,  and  one  with  the  change  in  real  GNP  lagged  two 
auarters-for  all age/sex  erou~s.  Males  25-54 were  the  onlv LOUD 
tb  be  significantly  affecTed  by  the  change  in  real  GNP’(g  thk 
95  oercent  level).  The  t value  of  the  coefficient  for  the  GNP 
vari‘able  was  hidest  for  real  GNP  lagged  one  quarter,  so  the 
results  of  that  regression  are  reported  in  the  table. 
4 The  misery  index  is generally  defined  as the  sum  of the  infla- 
tion  rate  and  the  unemployment  rate.  For  this  estimation,  it was 
specifically  defined  as  the  sum  of the  annual  rate  of  change  in 
the  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI)  from  eight  quarters  earlier  and 
the  civilian  unemployment  rate. 
In  the  Annual Report of t/ie Council of  Economic 
Aderi~~,  which  is  published  with  the  President’s 
Economic  Repon;  Reagan’s  Council  of  Economic 
Advisers  stated: 
The  Economic  Recovery  Tax  Act  of  1981  [ERTA] 
reduced  the  top  marginal  tax  rate  for  individual  income 
from  70  to  50  percent.  It  reduced  marginal  tax  rates  on 
given  levels  of  nominal  income  for  all  tax  brackets  while 
indexing  personal  exemptions,  the  standard  deduction,  and 
the  tax brackets  in  1985 to prevent  bracket  creep.  . . . The 
act  significantly  reduced  the  average  burden  of taxation  for 
American  families  compared  with  what  it would  have  been 
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tax  rates  acted  to  increase  the  incentives  to  work  and  to 
invest  IS,  pp.  86-7). 
After  evaluating  the  effects  of the  Tax  Equity  and 
Fiscal  Responsibiity  Act  of  1982  (TEFRA)  and  the 
Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  (TRA)  on  the  changes  in 
marginal  tax  rates  initiated  by  ERTA,  the  Council’s 
Annual Report observed  that  income  tax  savings  (for 
median  income  families  of four)  remained  substan- 
tial,  even  in  1988,  over  what  they  would  have  been 
under  the  tax  law in existence  in  1980.  The  report 
concluded: 
The  reductions  in marginal  tax  on  labor  income  encourage 
labor  force  participation,  particularly  of  second  earners. 
Because  TRA  reduced  the  difference  between  gross  wages 
and  net  wages  at  the  margin,  it provides  workers  with  an 
incentive  to  increase  their  work  effort  IS,  p.  90). 
Finally,  a great  deal  of publicity  was  given  in the 
early  1980s  to  the  Laffer  curve.  The  Laffer  curve 
was  based  on  a simple  truism-that  at  lower  levels 
of income  taxation,  raises  in tax rates  yield  more  total 
tax  revenue,  but  that  if  tax  rates  continue  to  rise 
individuals  eventually  lose  incentives  to  work  and 
invest,  so total  tax receipts  eventually  decline.  Thus, 
at  a  100  percent  tax  rate,  total  tax  receipts  would 
be  zero.  From  a political  point  of  view,  the  Laffer 
curve  provided  a rationale  for reducing  taxes  without 
reducing  government  spending,  provided  of course 
that  one  assumed  that  income  tax rates  already  were 
so  high  that  the  economy  was  operating  on  the 
downward  sloping  side  of  the  curve. 
The  foregoing  quotations  and  the  Laffer  curve  ra- 
tionale  for  tax  reduction  imply  that  lower  marginal 
tax  rates  will induce  individuals  to  work,  save,  and 
invest.  If  this  implication  is  correct,  one  would 
expect  labor  force  participation  rates  to rise  after  tax 
rate  relief. 
In fact,  however,  no evidence  of an increase  in the 
trend  rate  of labor  force  participation  was found.  As 
the  table  shows,  there  was  no  significant  upward 
movement  in  the  trend  rate  of  labor  force  partici- 
pation  in any  of the  ten  age/sex  groups  studied  after 
the  first half of 198 1, even  after  adjusting  for changes 
in  economic  conditions.5 
5 Of  course,  some  workers  may  have  responded  by  taking 
second  jobs;  a phenomena  that  would  not  show  up  in  the  par- 
ticipation  rate  data.  Data  on multiple  job  holding  were  gathered 
from  the  May  supplement  to  the  Census’s  Current  Population 
Survey  until  1980,  when  the  supplement  was  discontinued. 
Special  questions  included  in the  May  1985 CPS,  however,  asked 
about  multiple  job  holding,  so  data  are  available  for  1985.  By 
interpolation  a  quarterly  series  on  multiple  jobholders  was 
estimated  for  males  and  females  16 and  over  for  the  1970-85 
time  period.  The  estimates  were  then  added  to the  civilian  labor 
Why  did no such  effect  show  up? One  reason  may 
be that  the  incentives  were  not  large  enough.  At the 
same  time  that  the  income  tax  rates  were  being  re- 
duced,  for example,  the  payroll  taxes  (contributions 
for  social  security,  etc.)  were  rising.  A  1987  study 
by  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO),  for 
example,  concluded  that  the  effective  tax  rates  for 
overall  federal  taxes  were  slightly  higher  under  1988 
tax  laws  than  they  were  under  1977  tax  laws for  all 
but  the  highest  decile  of income  earners.6  The  CBO 
illustration  showing  the  different  effective  tax  rates 
by population  decile  is reproduced  here  as Figure  1. 
Chart  4 shows  personal  taxes  and  social  security 
contributions  as  percentages  of  personal  income 
before  tax  deductions.7  This  chart  does  show  a 
modest  reduction  in  average  taxes  after  1981. 
That  trends  in labor  force  participation  rates  did 
not  increase  after  1981  implies  either  (1) that  there 
were  no  significant  reductions  in marginal  tax  rates 
in the  1980s  or  (2)  that  the  reductions  in tax  rates 
had  no  significant  effect  on labor  force  participation. 
The  first  possibility  is contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the 
1989  Economic  Report of th  P&dent.  The  second  is 
contrary  to  the  supply-side  predictions  of  the  early 
1980s. 
Ill. 
OTHER  IMPLICATIONS  OF THE  DATA 
Discouraged  Workers 
Some  analysts  argue  that  individuals  will drop  out 
of  the  labor  force  if they  become  too  discouraged 
about  their  job  prospects.  Workers  therefore  would 
be  expected  to  increase  their  labor  force  participa- 
tion  in periods  of economic  expansion  and  decrease 
it  in  times  of  economic  contraction. 
forces  and  new  estimates  of participation  rates  were  devised  that, 
in effect,  counted  the  multiple  jobholders  as participating  twice. 
Regressions  were  run  on the  revised  participation  rates  over  the 
1970:2  to  1985:2  and  1976:l  to  1985:2  periods,  again with  the 
trend  and  trend  dummy  variables  as  arguments.  It  was  found 
that  adding  the  multiple  jobholders  made  no  difference  to 
the  regression  results,  and  again  all  of  the  coefficients  on 
“Trend  2” were  negative. 
6 The  data  utilized  in the  CBO  study,  however,  are  not  wholly 
appropriate  for analyzing  changes  in tax incentives  on labor  force 
participation.  The  CBO  procedure  allocated  both  employer  and 
employee  contributions  to  Social  Security  as  well  as  the 
family’s  share  of  the  corporate  income  tax  to  each  decile’s 
effective  tax  rate. 
7 Personal  income  as defined  by the  Bureau of Economic  Analysis 
includes  transfer  payments  net  of  personal  contributions  for 
social  insurance.  To  get  an  appropriate  before-tax  personal 
income  measure  to  be  used  as  the  denominator  for  the  series 
in Chart  4, personal  contributions  for social insurance  were  added 
to  the  BEA’s  personal  income  figure.  Thus,  the  before-tax 
personal  income  statistic  used  includes  transfer  payments  gr0.r.r 
of  social  insurance  contributions. 
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Changing  Distribution  of  Federal Taxes: 1975-1990,” 
October  1987,  Summary  Figure 1,  p. xv. 
The  data,  however,  show  that  since  1976  the 
only  participation  rates  that  were  significantly  related 
to  changes  in real  GNP  were  those  of males  in the 
Chart 4 
PERSONAL  TAXES 
&  S.S.  CONTRIBUTIONS 
As  Percent  of  Personal  Income  Receipts 
1977  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87 
25-54  age  group,  and  that  those  participation  rates 
were  not  related  to GNP  growth  in the way predicted 
by  the  discouraged  worker  hypothesis.  As the  table 
shows,  the  coefficient  on  the  change  in  real  GNP 
lagged  one  quarter  bears  a  negative  sign.8  Thus, 
the analysis implies  that  a decline  in the rate of growth 
in  real  GNP,  other  things  equal,  will  induce  a rise 
in the  rate  of labor  force  participation  of age  25-54 
males,  which  is  exactly  opposite  to  the  sort  of 
behavior  predicted  by the  discouraged  worker  effect. 
This  inverse  relation  between  real  GNP  growth 
and  male  25-54  participation  rates  is consistent  with 
either  (1)  the  backward-bending  supply  curve  of 
labor,  according  to which  workers  opt for more  leisure 
and therefore  drop  out of the  labor market  when  their 
incomes  rise  and  come  back  in when  their  incomes 
fall,  or (2) a variant  of the  backward-bending  supply 
curve,  the  additional  worker  effect. 
Additional  Workers 
Underlying  the  additional  worker  effect  is the  con- 
cept  that  secondary  workers  (nonbreadwinners)  enter 
the  labor  force  in  times  of  adversity  to  enable  the 
the  family  to maintain  its standard  of living. As noted 
above,  the  labor  force  participation  rate  behavior  of 
age  2.5-54 males,  who  increase  their  participation  as 
the  economy  expands  and  reduce  it as the  economy 
contracts,  would  be  consistent  with  the  additional 
worker  hypothesis  if  those  workers  were  indeed 
secondary  workers.  If male  2.554  participation  rates 
were  dominated  by  the  additional  worker  effect, 
however,  the  regression  of  them  on  the  misery  in- 
dex,  the  CPI,  or the  unemployment  rate  should  also 
have  been  significant.  It  was  not.  ’ 
Evidence  of the  additional  worker  effect  is found, 
however,  in the  regression  of female  ‘25.54 labor force 
participation  on the  trends  and the  misery  index.  As 
shown  in the  table,  the  regression  results  showed  a 
significant  positive  relation  between  the  misery 
index  and participation  rates  in the  female  25-54  age 
group. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  if  a  significant  negative 
correlation  between  the  rate  of growth  of real  GNP 
and the female  participation  rate had been  found,  that 
result  would  also  have  been  consistent  with  the 
additional  worker  hypothesis.  Intuitively,  however, 
it  seems  most  appropriate  to  identify  the  misery 
index  more  closely  with  the  additional  worker  effect 
than  the  change  in  real  GNP,  for  inflation  and 
8  The  sign  was  also  negative for the regression using the cur- 
rent change  in real GNP  as an argument.  The  coefficient  on the 
change in real GNP  lagged 3  quarters was not significantly 
different from zero. 
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family  real  incomes.  Therefore,  it seems  likely  that 
the  female  25-54  participation  rates  were  affected 
more  strongly  by  the  additional  worker  effect  than 
were  the  participation  rates  of  males  25-54. 
The  labor  force  participation  of  age  25-54  males 
seems  more  likely  to  stem  from  behavior  consistent 
with  the  classic backward-bending  supply  curve.  The 
rationale  for  the  backward-bending  supply  curve  is 
that  as individuals  achieve  certain  levels  of income, 
leisure  becomes  progressively  more  desirable  and 
pecuniary  income  progressively  less  desirable.  As a 
result,  wage increases  may  sometimes  induce  workers 
to  substitute  leisure  hours  for  work  hours. 
Speculations about Possible Effects of the 
Revolution  in Female  Labor  Force 
Participation 
As noted  earlier,  the  composition  of the  labor  force 
in  1988  is radically  different  from  that  of  1950.  If 
the  1950 participation  rates  had  continued  to prevail, 
the  1988  labor  force  would  contain  22 million  fewer 
female  workers  and  8  million  more  male  workers. 
Moreover,  the  growth  in the  female  labor  force  has 
drawn  from  the  prime  20-54  age  population,  while 
the  source  of decline  in the  male  labor  force  partici- 
pation  has  been  in  the  older,  55  and  over,  ages. 
One  of the  early rallying cries of the  feminist  revolu- 
tion  in  the  1950s  was  that  females  were  not  en- 
couraged  to  enter  the  labor  force,  but  rather  were 
expected  to  remain  home  and  nurture  their  children. 
If that  were  true  in the  fifties,  it has  changed  in the 
eighties.  As  Chart  1 shows,  over  55  percent  of  all 
women  over  16  participated  in  the  labor  force  in 
1988,  far higher  than  the  35  percent  female  partici- 
pation  rate  registered  in  1950. 
Whether  the  work  situation  for  females  has 
turned  out  to be  consistent  with  the  expectations  of 
the  feminist  revolution,  however,  is open  to  ques- 
tion.  First,  a  number  of  traditionally  female  jobs 
continue  to  pay  lower  wages  than  traditional  male 
jobs.  Second,  the  correlation  of  participation  rates 
of 25-54  year-old  females  with  the  misery  index  pro- 
vides  evidence  that  a proportion  of female  workers 
have  jobs  not  because  they  desire  to  work,  per  se, 
but  because  they  and  their  families  need  the  income. 
How  have  males  fared  since  1950?  Apparently 
quite  well.  Almost  45  percent  of  the  male  popula- 
tion  over  65 was in the  labor  force  in  1950,  but  only 
15 percent  in  1988.  Such  a change,  of course,  could 
indicate  that  prospective  employers  now  tend  to 
discriminate  against  older  men,  but  that  explanation 
seems  unlikely.  Rather,  the  reduction  in labor  force 
participation  of  65  and  over  males  most  likely  is 
beneficial  to  older  men,  as more  of those  who  want 
to  retire  are  now  able  to  do  so.  The  data  also  show 
declining  participation  rates  for 55-64  men,  especially 
since  1970.  Again,  the  trend  could  be  interpreted 
as hurtful  to  the  welfare  of  the  55-64  men,  but  the 
accuracy  of  such  an  interpretation  would  be  ques- 
tionable.  It seems  much  more  likely  that  the  declin- 
ing rates  for 55-64  men  indicate  increases  in welfare 
as  more  men  are  able  to  choose  early  retirement. 
This  decreasing  male  labor  force  participation  has 
come  in  the  face  of  stable  (65  and  over)  or  rising 
(55-64)  female  labor  force  participation  rates  in the 
older  age groups.  Does  this  development  mean  that 
the  older  men  are  now  living  a life of leisure  secured 
by their  retirement  benefits  and  the  earnings  of their 
breadwinning  spouses?  It  could.  Does  it  mean  that 
older  men  and  older  women  are  now  living  lives  of 
leisure,  traveling  around  the  country  in  their  RVs, 
using  up  the  inheritance  that  might  otherwise  have 
gone  to  children  and  grandchildren?  It  could,  for 
although  female  labor  force  participation  rates  have 
risen,  they  still do  not  exceed  male  labor  force  par- 
ticipation  rates.  Does  it mean  that  laid off older  males 
get  discouraged  about  their  job  prospects  and  drop 
out  of the  labor force?  It might,  but  participation  rates 
of older  men  do  not  seem  to  vary  in any  consistent 
way  with  the  rate  of growth  of real  GNP,  so if they 
get  discouraged  it  relates  more  to  secular  than  to 
cyclical  developments. 
So  who  has  benefitted  from  the  feminization  of 
the  work  force?  If benefit  is based  upon  freedom  to 
follow  one’s  preferences  without  worry  about  bread- 
winning,  the  beneficiaries  are not  all female,  nor  have 
all females  benefitted.  Rather,  older  men  are  now 
apparently  able  to  choose  to  retire  at  earlier  dates, 
while  some  prime  age  females  apparently  work  out- 
side  the  home  only  because  they  and  their  families 
are  facing  hard  times  and  they  cannot  afford  not  to 
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